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Blind quantum computation (BQC) is a model in which a computation is performed on a server
by a client such that the server is kept blind about the input, the algorithm, and the output of
the computation. Here we layout a general framework for BQC which, unlike the previous BQC
models, does not constructed on specific computational model. A main ingredient of our construction
is gate teleportation. We demonstrate that our framework can be straightforwardly implemented on
circuit-based models as well as measurement-based models of quantum computation. We illustrate
our construction by showing that universal BQC is possible on correlation-space measurement-based
quantum computation models.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Ac, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
From Shor’s factoring algorithm [1] to the BB84 quan-
tum key distribution protocol [2], quantum physics has
enabled to surpass classical computational algorithms
and communication protocols. A recent application of
quantum physics in the privacy of delegated computa-
tions has emerged in the blind quantum computation
protocols [3, 4]. A blind computation is a protocol which
allows a client to compute on a remote server with full
privacy about the computation and the results. Hence,
the client delegates a computation to the server with-
out letting the server know about the input, the com-
putation, and the output. It seems difficult (if not im-
possible) to perform universal classical computation on a
server blindly using only a classical communication chan-
nel and classical computers [5]. However, with a quan-
tum channel and a quantum computer in the server’s lab
blind computation becomes possible [3, 4]. A proof-of-
principle experimental implementation of this idea has
also been preformed recently [6]. A number of other
universal BQC scenarios has also been proposed, which
mainly differ with each other in implementation and ef-
ficiency [7–12].
As far as we know, all of the proposed BQC scenarios
are based on specific models. For example, the model
proposed in Ref. [4] is based on one-way measurement-
based quantum computation [13], whereas the model of
Ref. [10] is more suited for programmable quantum gate
arrays [14]. In this paper, we lift this model dependence,
and propose a fairly general framework for BQC which
can be more conducive for direct implementation on vari-
ous computational models such as general measurement-
based or circuit-based quantum computation, obviating
the need for simulating the framework from one model to
another. Our framework requires the server to be able to
perform Bell-basis measurements on one of its internal
qubits and the qubits sent by the client, and next can
swap these qubits. In addition, the client is required to
∗ koochakie@gmail.com
be able to prepare a family of entangled two-qubit states
which are locally equivalent to a Bell pair.
II. PRIVACY OF BQC PROTOCOLS
Let Q be a subset of BQP (bounded error quantum
polynomial time computational complexity class). Let P
be a quantum computation protocol in which two parties
are involved, which should collaborate to solve a prob-
lem, one as “client” and the other as “server,” sharing a
classical and a quantum channel with each other. We as-
sume the client has less quantum power than the server
in the sense that the client alone cannot solve all in-
stances of the problems in Q efficiently, but the server
alone has quantum devices that can solve any problem
in Q efficiently. We call P a blind quantum computation
protocol on Q if the client can solve any problem in Q
without revealing either of the problem, the algorithm,
and the answer to the server.
The description of any computation is transferred to
the server by using both classical and quantum chan-
nels. The states in the quantum alphabet should not
be mutually orthogonal; otherwise, the quantum channel
basically acts like a classical channel. The security of the
whole protocol is now related to how much information
the server can obtain from the channels, and what meth-
ods to use to prevent the server from such intrusions.
Placing “traps” in the computation is perhaps a
straightforward method to detect a privacy-invasive and
non-cooperative server. In the course of computation, the
client instructs the server to perform a given set of ran-
domly chosen non-entangling operations on a few qubits
using the BQC protocol— these qubits are chosen by the
client (without the knowledge of the server) as the traps.
Next the client randomly checks the states of the trap
qubits. Since there is no method to discriminate non-
orthogonal states perfectly, if the server tries to find any
clue about the computation from the quantum communi-
cations, there is always a nonzero chance he would make
mistake about the operation to be performed on the trap
qubits. Hence, a periodic direct or indirect checking of
the traps would catch the cheating server.
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2There also exists another privacy ensuring method for
BQC protocols, which employs a secret hidden in the
classical instructions sent by the client to the server
that effectively erases the information inside the quantum
communications about the computation [4, 15]. Later in
one of our examples, we elaborate on a similar privacy
mechanism for BQC—section IV C.
III. BASIC IDEA
In our construction of BQC, we shall employ the idea
of gate teleportation (GT). Thus we call our scheme
“gate-teleportation-based blind quantum computation”
(GTBQC). Here, we shortly review the idea of gate tele-
portation [14, 16, 17].
Consider the standard quantum teleportation protocol
applied on the state |ψ〉. Now rather than using a Bell
pair, |Φ+〉 := 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), let us use the state
|ΦV 〉 := 1 ⊗ V |Φ+〉, (1)
in which V is an arbitrary single-qubit unitary operation.
Thus the state of the teleported qubit becomes
V σ|ψ〉, (2)
where σ ∈ Σ := {1 , X, Y, Z} (Pauli matrices plus iden-
tity) is the by-product of the Bell-basis measurement of
the teleportation process.
We will employ this basic gate-teleportation idea later
throughout our construction in order to store a single-
qubit operation in an entangled state and apply it later
on demand. Consider V = {Vi} as the set of unitaries
from which the client makes the states |ΦVi〉. For the pro-
tocol to be blind, at least two of the states {|ΦVi〉} need to
be non-orthogonal. That is, 〈ΦVi |ΦVj 〉 = 12 trV †i Vj , there
should be non-vanishing at least for a pair of indices i, j.
IV. GTBQC FOR CIRCUIT MODELS
Assume that the server has a circuit-model quantum
computer. In order to perform BQC on this hardware, we
propose to use gate teleportation to implement one-qubit
gates. The client needs to be able to prepare |ΦVi〉 where
the set V = {Vi} is sufficient to construct universal one-
qubit gates. Thus, if the client wants the gate Vi to be
performed on a qubit of the server’s quantum register, the
client first prepares |ΦVi〉 (in which Vi is applied on the
second qubit of the Bell pair) and sends its qubits to the
server. The client next instructs the server to perform a
Bell-basis measurement on the first qubit of the pair and
the selected qubit of the register, and consider the second
qubit of the pair as the updated qubit of the register (we
call such procedure “GT procedure”). This amounts to
applying the gate Viσ, σ ∈ Σ rather than the intended
Vi operation. The server classically communicates the
resultant σ to the client. One can remedy the problem
of Viσ rather than Vi through the following adaptive ap-
proach. The client sends a series of |ΦV (j)〉 depending on
the results of previous measurements. A desired result is
a result of a Bell-basis measurement when σ(j) = 1 . At
the first step, the client applies V (1) = Vi using the GT
idea. If this action fails, i.e., V (1)σ(1) (with σ(1) 6= 1 )
has been implemented instead, the client sends another
state |ΦV (2)〉 with V (2) = Viσ(1)V (1)
†
. Continuing on this
fashion, if in the first l steps the desired result has not
been achieved, for step l + 1 the client sends |ΦV (l+1)〉,
where
V (l+1) = Viσ
(l)V (l)
†
. (3)
This stochastic process succeeds on average in 4 steps,
because each GT has a 1/4 chance of success independent
of the previous outcomes. This procedure completes the
process of applying single-qubit unitary operators.
It is possible to choose the set V and W—the two-qubit
gate which the server applies—such that the stochasticity
of single-qubit operations can be lifted. This possibility
relies on choosing elements of V such that they have a
commutativity property with respect to Σ. We choose
the set V and W such that they satisfy the following
properties
WΣ⊗ Σ ⊆ Σ⊗ ΣW, (4a)
VΣ ⊆ ΣV. (4b)
The first relation implies that the σ by-products can pass
through W (possibly with the new set of by-products).
The second relation grantees that for any V ∈ V and
σ ∈ Σ, there exists V ′ ∈ V and σ′ ∈ Σ such that σ′V =
V ′σ. Thus if the client wants to implement V , given
that the overall by-product of the previous GTs is σ, the
client needs to have the server perform the operation V ′
through GT. To design a BQC protocol using the above
property, one need to determine suitable W , and V.
For a universal quantum computation, we also need
to hide placement of two-qubit gates from the server.
Our approach here is akin to the idea used in Ref. [4].
Consider the following two-qubit operator:
R(U) := W †1 ⊗ UW, (5)
where U ∈ U(2). In general R(U) can be an entangling
gate. But the client chooses U either to be the identity
or a given operator S for which R(S) is entangling. To
apply U of R(U), the client prepares |ΦU 〉 and sends it to
the server and instructs similar recipe as the single-qubit
case. To hide the placements of the R(S) gates in the
computation, the client instructs the server to follow the
computation pattern as in Fig. 1, which helps spread two-
qubit gates (some of which trivial) all over the circuit.
In the following, we first discuss an example of the
set V and the two-qubit operation W which satisfy the
commutation relations in Eqs. (4). Next we describe a
modified non-stochastic version of our approach where
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FIG. 1. Schematic of the circuit-model BQC. The horizontal
axes shows the progress of time, while qubits i and i+ 1 (and
so on) belong to the server’s quantum register. After applying
each single-qubit operation between each pair of neighboring
qubits some R(U) is also applied. This two-qubit operation
can be either entangling or identity.
any single-qubit operation in SU(2) is allowed to be per-
formed by both the client and the server. Furthermore,
we also discuss a BQC protocol whose privacy does not
depend on placing trap qubits.
A. Example of a non-stochastic GTBQC
We choose the two-qubit gate of the protocol to be the
controlled-Z (CZ) gate. It can be seen that all one-qubit
unitaries passing through the CZ gate can be locally writ-
ten as Z(θ)σ for any σ ∈ Σ and Z(θ) := exp(iθZ/2) for
any θ ∈ R [18]. Thus condition (4a) is immediately sat-
isfied.
Let us assume
Vi = V0Z(θi), (6)
where V0 is a constant gate. To satisfy condition (4b),
we choose V0 as the member of Clifford group
C1 := 〈H,
√
Z〉, (7)
where H is the Hadamard gate. For example the set
V = {H,HZ(±pi/4)} is a universal set of one-qubit gates.
One can see that for Vi ∈ V, {|ΦVi〉} constitutes a non-
orthogonal set.
B. Different example of a non-stochastic GTBQC
Let the client be able to prepare |ΦV 〉 for any V ∈
SU(2). We also allow that the server to be able to per-
form all let SU(2) operators at each step. We now assume
that, in the first step, the client wants to apply the one-
qubit gate U1 on a qubit in the server. The client chooses
a random V1 ∈ SU(2) according to the Haar measure µ
of the group, and sends |ΦV1〉 to the server, which the
server should apply the GT procedure on. If the out-
come on the server side is applying V1σ1 (where σ1 does
not necessarily implies σx) the client asks the server to
perform R1 = τ1U1σ1V
†
1 on the same target qubit, where
τ1 has been chosen uniformly randomly from Σ. Thus,
overall the operation R1V1σ1 = τ1U1 is applied on the
target qubit. By knowing only R1 and σ1, the server can
not obtain any information about what U1 or τ1 is, be-
cause R1 is as random as V1 (independent of U1 and τ1),
i.e., µ(dR1) = µ(d(τ1U1σ1V
†
1 )) = µ(dV
†
1 ) = µ(dV1). The
role of the random τ1 in the protocol is to encrypt the
state of the server’s register qubit by using the quantum
Vernam cipher, in order to prevent the server to gain any
information about the state of the register.
Suppose that in the next step, the client wants to per-
form another one-qubit U2 on the same target qubit. The
client chooses a V2 randomly and asks the server to apply
it by using GT procedure on the target qubit. Next the
client asks the server to apply R2 = τ2U2τ1σ2V
†
2 on the
qubit, where σ2 is the by-product of the GT procedure,
and τ2 is chosen randomly from Σ. Next steps can be
applied by following a similar idea.
Here we choose a two-qubit gate W to be the CZ gate.
Now one can choose here an operator S = X(−pi4 ), where
X(θ) := exp(iθX/2), to implement R(S) which is locally
equivalent to the CNOT gate.
C. GTBQC without trap
In this section, we present a BQC protocol based on
the GT idea which does not require frequent checking of
the trap qubits to be blind. This protocol has hence a
privacy independent of the behavior of the server.
Assume that at each step the server can easily imple-
ment the set U = {Ui} of one-qubit gates, whose elements
are all necessary for universal quantum computation. Let
V := {Vij = U†jUi}. Now suppose that the client wants
to apply the gate Ui on a qubit in the server’s register.
Rather than asking the server to apply Ui, the client
chooses a random j ∈ {1, . . . , |U|}, sends the state |ΦVij 〉
to the server, and ask the server to perform the GT pro-
cedure. In the case that σ = 1 the client has the server
apply Uj on the register qubit, which means that overall
the client has instructed the server to apply UjVij = Ui
on the qubit without revealing i. To preclude revealing
any information out of |ΦVij 〉 we append a secret ran-
dom τ ∈ Σ at each step to UjVij , namely, UjVijτ . This
random τ effectively mixes the sent quantum stat |ΦV 〉,
because we have∑
τ∈Σ
1
4
|ΦV τ 〉〈ΦV τ | = 1
2
⊗ 1
2
, (8)
for any single-qubit unitary V .
It is not necessary for the rest of the discussion that V
has the form as Vij = U
†
jUi. Assume that the client wants
4the operation U ∈ U to be performed blindly. Thus V
should be applied by the GT procedure, and U ′ ∈ U must
be communicated through the classical channel and next
be applied by the server. Taking into account the by-
product of the Bell-basis measurement, the by-products
of the previous steps, and the secret τ , the overall applied
operation would become U ′V σ, where σ ∈ Σ is random
and unknown to the server (due to the inclusion of the
secret τ). For the operation U ′V σ to be equivalent to U
(up to a Pauli matrix and/or a phase factor), we need to
assume extra criteria similar to Eqs. (4). In particular,
we need that for any U ∈ U , and any σ ∈ Σ, there should
exist random choices for U ′ ∈ U , V ∈ V, and σ′ ∈ Σ such
that (up to some phase)
U ′V σ = σ′U. (9)
Blindness of the protocol necessitates that the probabil-
ity distribution of U ′ must be independent of U and τ .
In addition, to encrypt the state of the server’s register
qubit by using the quantum Vernam cipher, σ′ should be
random and unknown to the server, which is the case if
U ′ is chosen independent of τ . We also need criterion (4a)
to hold for the two-qubit gate W .
Given all the above criteria, let us see how the client
can instruct the server to apply blindly the one-qubit
gate U ∈ U on one of its register qubits. The steps of
this implementation are as follows: (i) The client chooses
V such that U ′ of Eq. (9) becomes a member of U , inde-
pendent of U and σ. (ii) The client prepares |ΦV 〉, sends
it to the server, and asks the server to apply the GT
procedure. (iii) The client chooses a random τ ∈ Σ and
finds U ′ ∈ U from Eq. (9) and asks the server to apply
U ′ (communicated classically to the server).
A specific example of the operations meeting the cri-
teria above is given here. Choose the two-qubit gate of
the protocol to be the CZ gate, and let Ui = HZ(θi),
where θi = pi i/4 for 0 6 i < 8. It is evident that
the set U = {Ui} is a universal set for building any
one-qubit gate. For V, choose V = {Vij |Vij = U†jUi =
Z(θi − θj) = Z(θi−j)}. One can see that for σ = Z,
UjVijZ = XUi, whence choosing a random j makes
the server blind about i. For the case σ = X or
Y , Vijσ = Z(θi−j)σ = σZ(θj−i) = σZ(θi−(2i−j)) =
σVi,2i−j . Also UkX = ZU−k and UkY = −Y U−k, where
−k ≡ 8 − k. Thus, here we have Uj−2iVijX = ZUi and
Uj−2iVijY = −Y Ui. Note that if j is chosen randomly,
this makes j − 2i random as well and independent of i
and σ.
V. GTBQC FOR MQC MODELS
In measurement-based quantum computation (MQC),
rather than performing unitary gates, quantum com-
putation is implemented by applying a series of adap-
tive single-site measurements on a highly entangled state
[13, 19]. LetM = {Mi} be the set of all single-site mea-
surements Mi needed to be performed in an MQC model.
Our idea here is to construct V such that its members
permute elements ofM. Let us restrict ourselves to pro-
jective measurements, where any measurement Mi can
be described by a set of orthogonal basis Mi ↔ {|mik〉}
(measurement basis). The unitary operator
Vij =
∑
k
|mjk〉〈mik|, (10)
substitutes measurement Mi for Mj , if applied to the
target qubit before the measurement. Hence to perform
Mi blindly, the client first applies Vij via the stochastic
GT procedure introduced in Sec. IV, with a random j.
Next, the client asks the server to measure the target
qubit in the Mj basis.
This process is stochastic works for all MQC models,
but requires the client to be able to prepare a relatively
large set of entangled states. We now show how to design
a blind MQC model which lifts the need for stochasticity.
In other words, we set up a series of constrains similar to
Eqs. (4) for blind MQC models. To this end, we use the
“correlation-space MQC” framework [18, 20, 21] for its
generality (in the sense that this framework can describe
all known MQC models).
A. GTBQC for correlation-space MQC
We first briefly review the ideas of the correlation-space
MQC [18, 20, 21]. A matrix product state (MPS) is a
state that can be written in the standard basis as follows:
|MPS〉 =∑
i1,i2,...,iN
〈L|AN (iN ) · · ·A2(i2)A1(i1)|R〉 |iN , . . . , i2, i1〉,
(11)
where N is the number of sites, 0 ≤ ij < D, and Aj(i)
is a d × d matrix attributed to state |i〉 of site j. Here
〈L| and |R〉 are the left and the right boundary vectors.
The amplitude coefficients of the MPS are computed by
a set of matrix multiplications in the so-called correlation
space. If we measure the jth site and the output state is
|ϕ〉, then the MPS becomes
|ϕ〉j〈ϕ| |MPS〉 =∑
i1,...,ij−1,ij+1,...,iN
〈L|AN (iN ) · · ·Aj [ϕ] · · ·A1(i1)|R〉
|iN , . . . , ij+1〉|ϕ〉|ij−1, . . . , i1〉, (12)
where Aj [ϕ] :=
∑
i ϕ
∗
iAj(i) and |ϕ〉 =
∑
i ϕi|i〉. Hence,
any operator in span(Aj) := {
∑
i αiAj(i)} can be real-
ized at the correlation space by a single-site measure-
ment. If we measure, e.g., l sequential sites after site
m of the MPS, we obtain the following operator in the
correlation space:
U = Am+l[ϕl] · · ·Am+2[ϕ2]Am+1[ϕ1]. (13)
5Thus, by choosing appropriate Aj as the lists of matrices
and suitable measurement bases, one can construct any
unitary in U(d) at the correlation space. Let us select
Aj and measurement bases such that Aj [ϕ] for any mea-
surement outcome at site j is a unitary operator. Ran-
domness of measurement outcomes causes that instead
of a desired |ϕ〉 as outcome one obtains |ϕ′〉. Therefore,
rather than U := Aj [ϕ], Aj [ϕ
′] is realized in the correla-
tion space. In such cases, we consider Aj [ϕ
′] as
Aj [ϕ
′] = E U, (14)
where E = Aj [ϕ
′]U† is the so-called “by-product oper-
ator.” Such by-products need to be somehow circum-
vented. Later, in Eq. (15), we will present conditions to
manage by-products.
Let us assume translationally-invariant correlation-
space MQC model, where Aj = A. The model is assumed
to be deterministic, that is, the number of steps needed
to perform any gate is predetermined. Let M = {Mi}
be the set of all single-site measurement Mi of the MQC
model, which are used to implement one-qubit gates. Let
U be the set of all single-qubit unitaries Ui that can be
performed at each step of the MQC model, which can
be taken as A[ϕ0i ], where |ϕ0i 〉 is the target measurement
result of Mi. Let E denote the set of all manageable
by-products of the MQC model. Thus, to manage by-
products, for any Uj ∈ U and any E ∈ E , there should
exist an Mi such that for any |ϕi〉 in Mi, we have
A[ϕi]E U
†
j ∈ E , (15a)
WE ⊗ E ⊆ E ⊗ EW, (15b)
where W is the two-qudit gate implemented in the MQC
model. Let V be the set of one-qubit unitaries from which
ΦV is constructed. When the client wants the gate Ui to
be implemented by the server, the sufficient criterion for
our non-stochastic blind MQC model to work is that for
any |ϕi〉 ∈ Mi and any σ ∈ Σ, there should exist an Mj
and V ∈ V such that
A[σV †|ϕj〉]A†[ϕi] ∈ E , (16)
for any |ϕj〉 ∈Mj . Hence, to blindly perform an A[ϕi] on
the server’s register site, the client sends |ΦV 〉 and asks
the server to perform the GT procedure, next asks the
server to measure the target qubit in the Mj basis.
B. Example of a GT-based blind MQC model
One way to satisfy criterion (16) is to have σV †|ϕj〉 ∈
Mi, for some Mi. Here we explicitly construct such set V
suitable for the one-way MQC model [13]. In this model,
the measurement basis is parametrized as
Mθ = {|θ±〉 := (|0〉 ± eiθ|1〉)/
√
2}. (17)
Now consider
Vγ := Z(−γ) = exp(−iγZ/2). (18)
By applying this operator for a random γ through the GT
procedure before a measurement Mβ (with β = α − γ),
the server will have Mα = Mβ+γ applied on his qubit.
Hence, in this manner, the client can hide α from the
server. Note that here the application of the Pauli ma-
trices is also a well behaving operation because
Mα
X−→M−α, (19)
Mα
Z−→Mα+pi. (20)
Thus by choosing β in accordance with the above con-
ditions (and depending on the output of the Bell-basis
measurement) criterion (16) will be satisfied. For a dis-
crete example, one can choose legitimate θs for Mθ from
{pi, pi/2,±pi/4}.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have shown that using the idea of storing one-qubit
gates in entangled pairs (“the gate-teleportation proce-
dure”), a client can perform blind quantum computation
on a remote server. We have demonstrated our idea for
quantum circuit model and measurement-based quantum
computation. We have illustrated our proposition for
blind quantum computation through four specific exam-
ples.
One remark is in order here. An alternative method for
the client to perform one-qubit gates, rather than stor-
ing in an entangled pair and having the server perform
a gate-teleportation operation (as we discussed earlier),
is to receive qubits from the server’s register and apply
the one-qubit gates on her own side and send the resul-
tant qubit to the server. However, our proposed gate-
teleportation approach has several advantages over this
alternative scenario. (i) In the qubit sending method,
the quantum channel needs to have the extra property of
preserving possible entanglement of the sent qubit with
the rest of the server’s register. In contrast, since in our
method the entangled pairs sent from the client to the
server are carried locally (with no residual entanglement
with any other qubits) no such long-distance entangle-
ment preservation property is required. (ii) In the non-
stochastic version of our approach, the client can in prin-
ciple send all the computation-carrying entangled pairs
(with appropriate sequence) once to the server. However
in the alternative approach sending and receiving register
qubits are needed in order to apply each single-qubit op-
eration. Thus our approach has a relative speedup with
respect ot the alternative qubit-sending method. One
can also apply the similar idea of sending all entangled
qubits once even for the stochastic version of our method,
possibly with some extra overhead. (iii) In our approach
it is straightforward to calculate the probability of de-
tecting a privacy-invasive/non-cooperative server by the
trap method, because the set V is independence of the
server’s quantum register. However, in the alternative
approach, since the client does not necessarily know the
6state of the register qubit sent from the server, it seems
difficult how to estimate the probability of revealing a
non-cooperative server. (iv) In some cases it may not be
practically possible to transfer any qubit of the server’s
quantum register.
Some interesting line to pursue for future progress, for
example, are to see how one can use multipartite entan-
glement for blind quantum computation, investigate its
potential benefits, an see how possibly one can reduce
necessary resources for this sort of computation, or im-
prove its overall performance.
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